The question
What we told them
Yes. Microsoft published a report on 30 Oct 2026 describing two intrusions that began exactly this way. The Hacker News covered it on 2 Nov 2026.
Attackers messaged and called employees on Teams from outside tenants with support-sounding names. They asked each person to open Quick Assist and read back the connection code. That code gave the attacker hands-on control of the PC. Nothing was exploited in Teams. The staff member opened the door.
From there, the attacker went after privileged accounts. In one case Microsoft saw certificates issued for 3 privileged accounts. About 90 minutes later, a second wave produced certificates for 8 more. Microsoft's automatic response cut off most of them. One privileged account had been excluded from that response, and the attacker used it to reach a file server and copy data to an outside server.
The certificate part matters only if you run your own Windows servers on site. If your business is Microsoft 365 only, the Teams and Quick Assist step is the one that applies to you.
Our opinion: training alone is the wrong control. A busy office manager cannot tell a real IT message from a fake one on sight, and she should not have to. Change the settings so the fake message never arrives, and so the real one has a known path.
Do three things. Limit which outside Teams tenants can contact your staff. Allow one approved remote-support tool and block the rest. Tell staff that any support request is confirmed by phone, on a number they already have, before anyone shares a screen.
Your staff cannot tell a real IT message from a fake one on sight. This week, limit outside Teams contact and name the one remote tool they are allowed to use.